HiSolutions Research

Eine 10 von 10 – Ivanti CVE-2023‑35078 – Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe


Update vom 10.08.2023:

Für Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) wurde am 03.08.2023 eine weitere Schwachstelle (CVE‑2023-35082) mit einer CVSS-Bewertung von 10.0 veröffentlicht. Die Schwachstelle ist ähnlich zu der initial veröffentlichen CVE-2023-35078. Am 07.08.2023 hat Invanti veröffentlicht, dass diese Schwachstelle alle Versionen von EPMM betrifft. Die Maßnahmen zum Schließen der Schwachstelle und einer Identifizierung eines Angriffs wurden in dem Dokument „Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe – CVE‑2023‑35078“ ergänzt.


Update vom 01.08.2023:

Auf Basis der bereits veröffentlichten Expoits konnte der String zur Identifizierung eines Angriffs genauer bestimmt werden. Diese finden Sie in dem Dokument „Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe – CVE-2023 35078“ unter dem Punkt 2.


Update vom 31.07.2023:

Seit dem Wochenende gibt es die ersten öffentlichen Proof of Concept Exploits auf GitHub. Die teilweise in Python geschriebenen Programme ermöglichen eine automatische Ausnutzung der Ivanti Schwachstelle CVE-2023-35078.

Zusätzlich wurde am 28.07.2023 von Ivanti eine weitere Sicherheitslücke (CVE-2023-35081) publiziert. Hierbei handelt es sich um eine Schwachstelle welche es dem Angreifer erlaubt als authentifizierten Administrator beliebige Schreibvorgänge auf dem EPMM-Server durchzuführen.


Am 24. Juli 2023 hat der Hersteller Ivanti Informationen zu der Sicherheitslücke CVE-2023‑35078  veröffentlicht. Die Schwachstelle betrifft die Software „Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile“ (EPMM), auch bekannt als MobileIron Core. Um unseren Kunden eine Möglichkeit zu geben, erste Maßnahmen zu ergreifen und ihre Systeme zu prüfen, haben wir einen Leitfaden „Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe – CVE-2023‑35078“ erstellt. Der Leitfaden kombiniert die öffentlichen Informationen der staatlichen Sicherheitsbehörden, Fach-Blogs und die Angaben des Herstellers mit der Expertise der HiSolutions.

Sollten Sie Ivanti bzw. MobileIron Core nutzen, prüfen Sie bitte anhand des Dokuments, ob Sie alle relevanten Maßnahmen ergriffen haben.

HINWEIS: Das Dokument wird laufend aktualisiert. Bitte achten Sie daher auch auf weitere Veröffentlichungen auf unserem Research-Blog. Weitere Informationen und Cybersicherheitswarnungen erhalten Sie auch beim Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) unter https://www.bsi.bund.de/SiteGlobals/Forms/Suche/BSI/Sicherheitswarnungen/Sicherheitswarnungen_Formular.html


Keine Gaudi: Fast Super-Cloud-GAU bei Microsoft

Bei Microsoft ist eingetreten, wovor sich viele Cloud-Anbieter insgeheim fürchteten: Getroffen hat es Azure mit seiner Cosmos DB, einer beliebten NoSQL-Datenbank. Das Datenbankmanagement wird dabei ganz im Sinn von PaaS weitgehend von Microsoft übernommen.

Nun haben Sicherheitsforscher eine Schwachstelle in der Funktion Jupyter-Notebook entdeckt. Dieses Feature war erst im Februar diesen Jahres durch Microsoft aktiviert worden. Der Vorgang zeigt, wie wichtig es ist, die Konfiguration in allen genutzten Cloud-Diensten beständig im Blick zu behalten und gerade neue Features sicherheitstechnisch kritisch zu bewerten.

Die Entdecker WIZ Research haben zur Schwachstelle folgendes Video erstellt:

Eine Webseite mit Informationen zur Schwachstelle ist hier zu finden: https://chaosdb.wiz.io/

Laut Microsoft kam es glücklicherweise nicht zu einem aktiven Ausnutzen dieser Schwachstelle, siehe folgende Stellungnahme:

Positiv hervorzuheben ist, dass nur zwei Tage nach Meldung der Sicherheitslücke das betroffene Jupyter-Notebook-Feature durch Microsoft deaktiviert wurde, sowie der offene Umgang mit der Schwachstelle.

Fix Once, Secure Everywhere

Dies zeigt einen weiteren Vorteil der Cloud: Wenn eine Schwachstelle im Zuständigkeitsbereich des Cloud-Anbieters liegt, muss diese in der Regel nur durch den Cloud-Anbieter gefixt werden. Auf der anderen Seite ist dies auch ein Unterscheidungsmerkmal in Bezug auf Anbieterqualität: Nur ein Cloud-Anbieter, der schnell reagiert, bietet den Kundendaten entsprechenden Schutz.

CV? Neee…

Leider gibt es – anders als für Schwachstellen in Anwendungen und Betriebssystemen – keine dedizierte Datenbank für Schwachstellen in Cloud-Diensten. Denn CVE-Nummer werden nur vergeben, wenn die die Software durch den Kunden kontrollier- bzw. installierbar ist (https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2018/08/13/cve-cloud-services-part-1/).

HiSolutions Research

High-Impact Vulnerabilites In Multiple USB Network Servers

Within the scope of a recent penetration test and through individual research effort, HiSolutions’ security consultants discovered multiple previously unknown high-impact vulnerabilities in USB network server firmwares (see individual issues for the CVE IDs). Devices of multiple vendors were affected by similar vulnerabilities. HiSolutions responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities to the vendors and additionally provided feedback on the implemented patches.

Background Information

USB network servers or USB network MTP and printer servers are devices that can be used to make USB devices accessible to multiple users via the network. Users install a software on their client and can then access USB devices without the need to physically plug the device into the local system. If devices are used by multiple users the devices do not have to be transfered between different systems each time the user changes. Use cases include shared USB network drives, USB Printers, or USB license dongles that can be used by authenticated users on the local network. All of the investigated devices were provided with an individual client software that runs on the local systems. All systems also exposed a web server that could be used to make administrative changes to the system.

The Vulnerabilities

HiSolutions consultants discovered four noteable vulnerabilities in each of the investigated devices.
The devices were:

  • TP-Link TL-PS310U (version v2.000, fixed in 2.079.000.t0210)
  • Digitus da-70254 (version 2.073.000.E0008)
  • Lindy No. 42633 (version v.2.078.000)
  • one other reviewed device of an (at this time) undisclosed vendor

Exposure of the Administrative Password Over Network Broadcast

The following CVE IDs were issued for this vulnerability: CVE-2020-15054 (TP-Link), CVE-2020-15058 (Lindy), CVE-2020-15062 (Digitus).

The USB network servers send the password of the local administrator account repeatedly and without request across the local Network via UDP broadcast. Every system on that network can read the password from these unencrypted broadcasts. The password is sent in UDP packets to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255 as can be seen in the following packet capture:

wireshark packet capture screenshot of administrative password in udp network traffic
Figure 1: UDP broadcast of the administrative password “PASSWORDABC”.

All systems in the local network receive the administrative password. In theory, the password is then used to locally check against the password entered by the client on the local system. In practice, an attacker can easily retrieve the password from the UDP broadcast messages and thus
circumvent the access restrictions to the administrative interface. The attacker then can use all functions provided by the USB network server, including restricted ones. If the password is reused (which is strongly discouraged but often the case) this design error could give an attacker access to other systems that use the same password.

Authentication Bypass in Web Administration Interface

The following CVE IDs were issued for this vulnerability: CVE-2020-15055 (TP-Link), CVE-2020-15059 (Lindy), CVE-2020-15063 (Digitus).

In some cases the password authentication requirement in the web interface can be bypassed when the password parameter is removed from the request. This enables an unauthenticated user to access privileged functions on the interface.
As an example, the following request will change the server name, a functionality that would normally only be available if the configured password was provided:

POST /csystem33.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.10
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/60.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,/;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.0.10/csystem33.htm
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 53
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
%24A0%24=New+Name+No+Password&%24B2%24=38&%24B3%24=39 

As is visible in the request, no password is provided and the corresponding Parameter is removed entirely. Without the password parameter the authentication does not fail, but instead the server simply implies that no password was set, thus allowing the operation without any user authentication.

Because of that, unauthenticated users can access administrative functions on the system without knowledge of the administrative password, therefore bypassing the authentication. This effectively disables the access control for the entire administrative interface.

Persistent Cross-Site Scripting

The following CVE IDs were issued for this vulnerability: CVE-2020-15056 (TP-Link), CVE-2020-15060 (Lindy), CVE-2020-15064 (Digitus).

The parameter for the server name is vulnerable to a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack. This results in the possibility for an attacker to execute JavaScript code in the context of the victims browser.

If the corresponding request is sent to the server, the server name gets embedded into the JavaScript file unfiltered and unescaped:

var myServer = new Server();
myServer.model = '';
myServer.manuf = '';
myServer.name = 'TestName';alert('Successful XSS');//';
myServer.hw = 'V. 2.000';
//myServer.tempFW = '2.255.255';
tempFWVersion = '';
myServer.fw = tempFWVersion.substring(0,1) + '.' +
tempFWVersion.substring(1,3);
myServer.mac = '34:e8:94:20:47:78';

The vulnerability allows attackers to execute JavaScript code in the context of the browser of the victim by manipulating the stored server name. Attackers in the local network could insert a custom script that is loaded each time an administrator visits the web administration interface. They can thereby gain persistent access to the web interface and attack other systems in the local network through the browser of the victim.
Normally, administrative access to the web interface would be needed to exploit this vulnerability, which would lower the impact. In combination with other vulnerabilities (like the authentication bypass) this exploit works for all users with access to the system.

Denial of Service

The following CVE IDs were issued for this vulnerability: CVE-2020-15057 (TP-Link), CVE-2020-15061 (Lindy), CVE-2020-15065 (Digitus).

Users can crash the USB network servers by sending long input values. For some lengths, the servers hang or act unexpectedly. while longer input values (e.g. 1103 characters) will crash them entirely. A reboot or sometimes reset of the device is needed to clear the issue.

After receiving too long input values the system no longer responds to network requests. The UDP broadcasts show that when setting a long server name other variables were most likely overwritten:

Wireshark packet capture screenshot of the buffer overflow from the server name
Figure 2: Buffer overflow from the server name (top: normal, bottom: after attack)

An attacker can use the buffer overflow vulnerability to impact the availability of the server. The shown behaviour indicates that the buffer overflow could also be used to execute functions or code on the system. This possibility was not investigated during the project.

Remediation

The vendors TP-Link and Lindy provided an updated firmware that fixes the vulnerabilities.

When using a device for which no patch is available, make sure that the chosen password is not reused on any other system or application.
Access to the devices could also be restricted on network level to limit the possibility of an attacker accessing the web interface or sniffing the broadcast traffic.

Responsible Disclosure Timeline

The vulnerabilities were reported to each of the vendors via e-mail. It was made clear that HiSolutions will follow defined responsible disclosure policy and aims to release information about the vulnerabilities in coordination with the vendor.
Each but one vendor reacted to the initial contact and in the following dialogue was provided with additional information on the vulnerabilities.
The vendors named in this advisory provided patches to mitigate the security issues. Hisolutions tested the patches for their effectiveness until the discovered vulnerabilities were closed and follow-up problems solved adequately.

N1QL Injection in Couchbase Sync Gateway – CVE-2019-9039

Within the scope of a recent penetration test, HiSolutions security consultants encountered a Couchbase Sync Gateway and discovered a previously unknown, high-impact injection vulnerability (CVE-2019-9039).

Background Information

The Couchbase Sync Gateway is a product developed by Couchbase Inc. as part of their mobile product portfolio. It is used to connect web, mobile, and IoT apps (Couchbase Lite) to the backend database (Couchbase Server). The publically accessible Sync Gateway synchronizes the data with the internal backend database servers and employs various security and integration features.

Couchbase uses a database query language called N1QL (https://www.couchbase.com/products/n1ql ) (pronounced “nickel”). N1QL extends SQL for JSON. It combines the syntax of traditional SQL with the benefits and flexibility of NoSQL databases.

From a security standpoint, N1QL is comparatively unexplored. SQL injections are a well-known and broadly explored security risk for traditional SQL databases. With increased use of NoSQL databases, NoSQL injection has become a more widely known topic as well. For both vulnerabilities, numerous tools, articles and presentations exist that detail every aspect of exploitation.

N1QL Injections

A 2015 blog post (https://blog.couchbase.com/couchbase-and-n1ql-security-centeredgesoftware/) discusses various aspects of N1QL injections. N1QL is claimed to be more resistant to injection attacks than traditional SQL. This is due to the following syntactic differences:

  • Query stacking is not possible in N1QL. That is, terminating a previous query with a semicolon and appending another query will result in an invalid syntax error in N1QL.
  • N1QL does not allow commenting out just the remainder of a line. N1QL only allows C-style comment blocks (/* comment */). This prevents an attacker from terminating a query by inserting “/*” or “–” at the injection point.

The blog post also mentions generic advice for preventing injections. Apart from that, information regarding N1QL injections is very sparse.

The vulnerability

HiSolutions consultants discovered that the Couchbase Sync Gateway in combination with a Couchbase Server is affected by a previously undisclosed N1QL-injection vulnerability in the REST API. An attacker with access to the public REST API can insert additional N1QL statements through the parameters “startkey” and “endkey” of the “_all_docs” endpoint.

The following request triggers an error:

https://host:port/{db}/_all_docs?startkey=1%271&endkey=

The client will receive the following error statement indicating a N1QL error:

{"rows":[
{"error":"Internal Server Error","reason":"Internal error: [3000] syntax error - at 1"}

On a server with the standard installation of Couchbase Server and Couchbase Sync Gateway, the following error will appear in the logfile:

2019-02-15T14:00:51.892+01:00 [WRN] Error when querying index using
statement: [SELECT META(`test-getting-started`).id as id,
meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync.rev as r,
meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync.sequence as s,
meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync.channels as c FROM
`test-getting-started` WHERE meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync.sequence
> 0 AND META(`test-getting-started`).id NOT LIKE '\\_sync:%' AND
meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync IS NOT MISSING AND
(meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync.flags IS MISSING OR
BITTEST(meta(`test-getting-started`).xattrs._sync.flags,1) = false) AND
META(`test-getting-started`).id >= '1'1' ORDER BY META(`test-getting-started`).id] --
base.(*CouchbaseBucketGoCB).Query() at bucket_n1ql.go:63

The error (injection point at ‘1’1′ near the bottom) shows that it is possible to break out of the original query and insert additional N1QL code. An additional character after the apostrophe seems to be required to trigger the error.

Furthermore, it is possible to end the current query and thereby skip the rest of the original query by inserting a null byte at the end of the manipulated parameter value.

The insertion of an additional comparison can be used to validate the injection. When inserting an additional requirement that is always true (“AND 1=1”), the original results are returned:

/{db}/_all_docs?startkey=123%27%20AND%201%3d1%00&endkey=

Inserting a statement that always evaluates to false (“AND 1=0”) yields no results:

/{db}/_all_docs?startkey=123%27%20AND%201%3d0%00&endkey=

The following request can be used to extract additional information from a default installation:

/{db}/_all_docs?startkey=123%27%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT
%20TOSTRING(BASE64_DECODE("U1FMLUl
uamVjdGlvbg=="))%20as%20id%3b%00&endkey=

The inserted N1QL statement “UNION ALL SELECT TOSTRING(BASE64_DECODE(“U1FMLUluamVjdGlvbg==”)) as id” adds the following line to the output and shows that N1QL functions and queries are evaluated:

{"rows":[
{"key":"SQL-Injection","id":"SQL-Injection","value":{"rev":""}}
...

The same injection works for the parameter “endkey”.

Additional modification of the query seems to be required to make UNION-injections work when channels and users are set up for the database. Data extraction methods that rely on comparisons will work as shown.

Impact:

An attacker with access to the public REST API is able to issue additional N1QL statements and extract sensitive data or call arbitrary N1QL functions. By issuing nested queries with CPU-intensive operations, he might be able to cause increased resource usage and denial of service conditions.

Remediation:

Traditional remediations for SQL injection vulnerabilities also apply to N1QL. Features like parameterized N1QL queries should be used to prevent the injection of N1QL statements into the original query.

As the vulnerability exists in the default Couchbase Sync Gateway, an update will fix the problem. HiSolutions has responsibly reported the issue to the vendor. The fix is available in Sync Gateway v2.5 as well as in v2.1.3.

Short-term remediation can be implemented by blocking all requests containing “startkey” or “endkey” on the web-interface.

Responsible Disclosure Timeline

15.02.2019 – HiSolution initially notifies security@couchbase.com with vulnerability details and the internal responsible disclosure guideline.

20.02.2019 – Couchbase acknowledges the vulnerability and states that an engineering team is working on the issue. Couchbase offers to help with the CVE request to MITRE.

23.02.2019 – HiSolutions inquires whether the engineering team was able to reproduce the issue and requests an ETA for a patch. HiSolutions notifies Couchbase that a CVE number was requested.

23.02.2019 – MITRE assigns CVE-2019-9039 for the vulnerability.

26.02.2019 – Couchbase sends an email to HiSolutions with their assessment of the CVSS (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L). Couchbase states in this email that a patch is under development and that they will follow up with an ETA. Couchbase requests the CVE number.

26.02.2019 – HiSolutions sends the CVE number to Couchbase and questions the assessed CVSS. User interaction should be “none” from HiSolutions perspective (CVSS v3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L).

26.02.2019 – Couchbase explains their assessment of the CVSS and states that they will follow up an ETA for the patch.

25.03.2019 – HiSolutions inquires  if an ETA is available and explains the assessment of the User Interaction CVSS vector.

12.04.2019 – HiSolutions inquires if the last email was received successfully. HiSolutions reminds Couchbase that the issue is scheduled for disclosure on 21.05.2019 and request to be notified if more time is needed by Couchbase.

15.04.2019 – Couchbase apologizes for the delayed response. The patch for the Sync Gateway is expected at the end of April. Couchbase agrees to a public disclosure on 21.05.2019. Couchbase informs HiSolutions that they will list the issue on a changed website under https://www.couchbase.com/resources/security within a table containing all vulnerabilities, fix release dates, versions, and affected products.

14.05.2019 – HiSolutions notices that the patch is applied in the latest public version. HiSolutions sends an inquiry regarding the vulnerability table on the website and if 21.05.2019 is still good for the disclosure.

21.05.2019 – HiSolutions postpones the disclosure because no answer was received.

11.06.2019 – HiSolutions inquires regarding the table on the website and a new disclosure date. A delivery failure for the contact address of the initial contact within the security team is received. The email is resent to the security team with the request for an answer by another team member.

12.06.2019 – Couchbase replies that the fix is included in Sync Gateway v2.5 as well as in v2.1.3. The release notes for both products will be updated in the following days to include a reference to the vulnerability. Couchbase is actively working on the vulnerability table. While unclear if the table will be finished until 21.06.2019, HiSolutions can disclose the issue on 21.06.2019 if Couchbase has updated the release release notes until then.

Further references

https://docs.couchbase.com/dotnet-sdk/2.2/prepared-statements.html https://docs.couchbase.com/java-sdk/2.7/n1ql-query.html#devguide-named-placeholders